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COMMERCIAL LAW AND INVESTMENT
ARTICLES
THE REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AND
FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN JAPAN
Dean C. Alexandert
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an overview of both domestic and for-
eign financial institutions operating in Japan. Also, it discusses
the obstacles of foreign financial institutions attempting to pro-
vide services in the Japanese market. Part I describes the bank-
ing regulatory guidelines of national treatment and reciprocity.
Part II explains the types of financial institutions in Japan and
their functions. Part III describes the Japanese financial scandal
that was recently exposed and its implications. Part IV provides
an overview of foreign financial institutions operating in Japan.
Part V critiques the complaints brought by foreign financial in-
stitutions regarding their treatment in Japan. Part VI describes
Japan's response to these complaints. Part VII lists the signifi-
cant developments in financial deregulation affecting banking
institutions in Japan. Part VIII discusses the U.S. legislative re-
sponses to Japanese barriers confronting foreign financial insti-
t B.A., Dipl6me Program (thesis in progress), J.D., LL.M. Mr. Alexander, who has
published articles on various international legal issues, edited CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ISSUES: SHARING PAN-EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1992). Mr. Alexander is the President of Septacontinentaux Corpora-
tion in Bethesda, Maryland. He wishes to dedicate this article to his grandparents.
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tutions. Part IX concludes that the Japanese have made signifi-
cant progress in their treatment of foreign financial institutions,
but further liberalization would assist both Japanese and non-
domestic banks in Japan.
I. BANKING REGULATORY GUIDELINES OF NATIONAL
TREATMENT AND RECIPROCITY
Nations regulate foreign financial institutions under either a
national treatment or reciprocity model.1 Under a national treat-
ment model, a foreign banking institution is treated the same as
a domestic banking institution whereby the legal burdens and
benefits are the same.2 In other words, the activities that a for-
eign bank carries out in the host country are the same as those
that a domestic bank performs.' Sometimes treatment of a for-
eign banking institution, termed national treatment plus, oc-
curs.4 Under this framework, a foreign financial institution is
treated better than the domestic financial institution.'
Under a reciprocity model, a host nation authorizes the es-
tablishment of a foreign financial institution solely on the condi-
tion that the applicant's home country similarly authorizes the
establishment of the host country's institutions in the appli-
cant's domestic market.6 Generally, host countries that favor
reciprocity require that the applicant's home country permit
some form of foreign entry, but not necessarily one that is iden-
tical to the one offered by the applicant's country.'
Difficulty exists in implementing a reciprocity model since
Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, International Trade in
Services: Banking 9, 13 (1984) [hereinafter OECD]; Brian W. Semkow, The American
Trade Deficit With Japan: Whither The Role of Japanese Financial Reregulation of
Liberalization, MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 39, 54-57 (1988). See generally R.M. PECCHIOLI,
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BANKING (1984); RICHARD DALE, THE REGULATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL BANKING (1984); Michael J. Feinman, National Treatment Of Foreign
Banks Operating in the United States: The International Banking Act of 1978, 11 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. (1979).
' Semkow, supra note 1, at 55.
3 Id.
Id.
Q0ECD, supra note 1, at 13.
6Id.
' Id. See generally JONATHAN D. ARONSON & PETER F. COWHEY, TRADE IN SERVICES:
A CASE FOR OPEN MARKETS 35-39 (1984).
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the home country regulatory frameworks of prospective banks
from different nations are varied. As a result, the host country
faces the possibility of permitting the same type of financial in-
stitution from different countries to carry out diverse financial
activities. Yet, if greater harmonization - and ultimately uni-
formity - of home country financial laws were to exist, the imple-
mentation of reciprocity models would be much easier.
In a May 1984 Report on Yen/Dollar Exchange Rates Is-
sues,8 Japan and the United States agreed that Japan should ac-
cord foreign financial institutions national treatment.0 Similarly,
the parties indicated the need for greater transparency in the
manner Japanese capital market regulations and laws are carried
out. Increased transparency would enable greater access to non-
Japanese firms.10 Japan planned to implement the national
treatment model in the following ways: by permitting foreign fi-
nancial firms to participate in the activities that Japanese trust
banks carry out; by permitting foreign financial firms to partici-
pate in government securities markets; and by assisting foreign
firms to join the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)."
Yet, in its discussion, Japan did not give an absolute guar-
antee to follow the national treatment framework. Rather, Japan
could choose to administer domestic and foreign financial insti-
tutions using the reciprocity model. In doing so, "foreign finan-
cial institutions in Japan would be accorded the same treatment
as Japanese financial institutions in the foreign country with re-
spect to regulation and supervision as well as business powers."' 2
As will be demonstrated in this paper, Japan's treatment of for-
eign financial institutions can be categorized as using either a
national treatment or a reciprocity regime, depending on the
area of regulation.
The openness or restrictiveness of a banking system - in a
8 JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FIN., U.S. DEPT. oF TREAs., REPORT ON YEN/DOLLAR Ex-
CHANGE RATE ISSUES, at § V(B)(1)-(3) (1984) [hereinafter EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES]; see
JEFFERY A. FRANKEL, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L EcONOMICS, POLICY ANALYSIS IN INT'L ECONOM-
ICS No. 9, THE YEN/DOLLAR AGREEMENt LIBERALIZING JAPANESE CAPITAL MARKETS 3
(1984).
9Id.
10 EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES, supra note 8, at § V(B)(3).
1 Id. at §§ V(B)(1)-(2), V(A)(4); Semkow, supra note 1, at 54.
Semkow, supra note 1, at 55.
1992]
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host or home country - will influence a prospective bank's pref-
erence for either the national treatment or reciprocity models."i
For example, a financial institution whose home country has a
liberalized regulatory scheme would prefer a reciprocity model
when it operates in a country with a more stringent legal frame-
work.14 In contrast, a financial institution whose home country
has a stringent regulatory framework would prefer a national
treatment model when it operates in a country with a more lib-
eralized framework. 15 Consequently, the conflict between the use
by a host country of either reciprocity or national treatment
models results in inconsistent and contradictory approaches
when dealing with foreign financial institutions. 6
Due to the Japanese restrictions on financial services in gen-
eral, and on foreign institutions in particular, foreign financial
institutions generally prefer to be regulated under the frame-
work of reciprocity.1 7 For example, German banks, which enjoy
great freedoms in their country, prefer the reciprocity ap-
proach.18 Since a strict reciprocity standard is not possible in Ja-
pan, national treatment is preferable to a standard of less than
national treatment. Also, transparency in the regulation of for-
eign financial institutions is necessary "toward[s] entry into and
operations in the Japanese capital market[s],"' 9 so that non-do-
mestic financial institutions would have "equal effective
opportunity."2
13 Id. See Japan's National Study on Trade in Services, JAPAN ECON. J., Oct. 1984,
at 55. "The concept of regulatory arbitrage embraces the notion that securities firms will
migrate from one jurisdiction to another to avoid markets subject to relatively more
stringent rules governing disclosure, manipulative conduct, and other regulations protec-
tive of investors." Manning G. Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws:
The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 189 (1990).
14 Semkow, supra note 1, at 55.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 55-56. See OECD, supra note 1.
17 EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES, supra note 8, at § V(B) introduction; see generally
Semkow, supra note 1, at 54-55.
18 Semkow, supra note 1, at 56.
19 EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES, supra note 8, at § V(B) introduction; Semkow, supra
note 1, at 54.
10 Semkow, supra note 1, at 54.
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II. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) plays a key role in regulat-
ing a host of issues in the arena of Japanese finance.2 ' The MOF
consists of seven bureaus and a Secretariat. 22 Of the various bu-
reaus, three are paramount:23 the Banking Bureau;24 the Securi-
ties Bureau;25 and the International Finance Bureau.
21
For many years, Japanese financial institutions were at the
zenith of international finance.27 In fact, in 1990, the following
description was provided:
Japanese banks, ranked by asset size, occupy seven out of the top
ten places in global ratings; the world's top ten banks ranked by
market share are all Japanese, with some $2 trillion of interna-
2, David Lake, Bankers as Brokers, Bus. TOKYO, Sept. 1991, at 46, 47.
" Id. at 47.
23 Id.
2 Id. The Banking Bureau consists of three parts: "[tihe coordination division fixes
reserve rates, oversees interest-rate adjustments and regulates funds available to finan-
cial institutions. The commercial-bank division licenses and supervises banks in coopera-
tion with the inspection division. The insurance division licenses all aspects of the insur-
ance industry." Id.
"' The Securities Bureau's "major divisions include coordination, capital manage-
ment, corporate finance, secondary-market trading and inspection. Corporate disclosures
and the investment-advisory business are subject to its supervision. Securities regulation
is also enforced by the bureau and its branch offices." Id. Unfortunately, the Securities
Bureau is woefully understaffed. Kaori Shoji, MOF In The Hot Seat, Bus. TOKYO, Sept.
1991, at 4. After all, while the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission staff numbers
2,400, the MOF's Securities Bureau includes only thirty-five. Id.
2" The International Finance Bureau's "short-term capital markets division super-
vises Japanese financial institutions and manages foreign-exchange reserves. The foreign-
investment division watches portfolio investment, the floatation of securities, the
Euroyen bond market and other capital-market activities." David Lake, supra note 21,
at 47.
2" Tony Shale, Capital and Costs Curb Global Ambitions, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1990,
at 113 [hereinafter Shale, Global Ambitions]; Clay Chandler, Japanese Banks Are Sur-
viving Bubble's Burst, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1991, at As [hereinafter Chandler, Bubble's
Burst]. But see Sterngold, Good Times for Japan's Banks?, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1991, at
F13. Yet:
1990 was a miserable year for Japan's financial sector, as interest rates soared,
stocks plummeted and bank profits evaporated. But it was a great year for the
financial press, which spun out dire warnings that Japan's overextended financial
institutions were teetering dangerously and might take the Western World down
with them.
Id. Nevertheless, the future of the city banks appear rather bright. In fact, Robert
Zelinski, a senior analyst at Jardine Fleming Securities in Tokyo suggests that city
banks' profits would increase fifteenfold between now and 1994. Id.
1992]
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tional business on their books; Japanese banks account for over
38% of all such lending; Tokyo has the world's largest stock mar-
ket and is expected to surpass London as the financial centre
where most foreign exchange is traded; and Japanese banks are
leading their international competitors in credit ratings and hid-
den assets.2 8
Yet, as will be discussed later, 1991-92 brought unfavorable news
to both the profitability and prestige of Japanese financial
institutions.
The banking industry in Japan consists of government and
commercial banks.2 " The government banks in Japan include the
Bank of Japan and the Export and Import Bank of Japan.30 The
Bank of Japan, the central bank, issues bank notes and coins
and carries out the traditional functions of a central bank.31 The
Export and Import Bank of Japan provides, inter alia, financing
for foreign purchasers of Japanese products.2
Generally, Japanese commercial banks are separated into
four groups: ordinary banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks,
and foreign exchange banks. 33 First, the ordinary banks include
twelve city banks and an additional sixty-four regional banks.34
Among the strongest of the city banks are Fuji, Mitsubishi, Dai-
Ichi Kangyo, and Sumitomo.' 5 Second, long-term credit banks
28 Shale, Global Ambitions, supra note 27, at 113.
29 See Frances Rosenbluth, The Political Economy of Financial Reform in Japan:
the Banking Act of 1982, 6 UCLA PAC. BASIN J. 62 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenbluth, Polit-
ical Economy]; FRANCES ROSENBLUTH, FINANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN
(1989) [hereinafter ROSENBLUTH, CONTEMPORARY]; JAPANESE BANKING, SECURITIES, AND
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 17 (Hiroshi Oda and R. Geoffrey Grice eds., 1988).
20 Oda, supra note 29, at 17.
2) Id. See generally YOSHI SUZUKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN:
THE THEORETICAL SETTING AND ITS APPLICATION 5-13 (1980); ROBERT A. FELDMAN, JAPA-
NESE FINANCIAL MARKETS: DEFICITS, DILEMMAS AND DEREGULATION 42-52 (1986).
32 Terutomo Ozawa, Japan's Largest Financier of Multilateralism: The EXIM
Bank, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 599, 602 (1986). See Oda, supra note 29, at 17; ROSEN-
BLUTH, CONTEMPORARY, supra note 29; Rosenbluth, Political Economy, supra note 27;
Dean C. Alexander, The Export-Import Bank of the United States Battle Against Sub-
sidized Export Credits, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 267 (1991).
32 See Oda, supra note 29, at 17; ROSENBLUTH, CONTEMPORARY, supra note 29; Feld-
man, supra note 31.
34 Oda, supra note 29, at 18. But see Gerhard Hinterhauser, Down Tumble the Bar-
riers, BANKER, Jan. 1987, at 65-66 (listing thirteen city banks) [hereinafter
Hinterhauser].
32 Rosenbluth, Political Economy, supra note 29, at 65. See Chandler, Bubble's
[Vol. 4:271
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were created by the Law of Long-Term Credit Bank, which aims
to provide long-term finance in Japan.36 The long-term credit
banks include the Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd., the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan Ltd., and the Nippon Credit Bank
Ltd.37 Noteworthy is that the long-term credit banks are able
"to issue debentures of five to seven years maturity in exchange
for long-term lending to industry."3 Third, trust banks essen-
tially make lengthy loans to corporations, issue long-term deben-
tures, and receive extensive monies from pension funds and
trust accounts.3 9 Fourth, the Bank of Tokyo, the only foreign ex-
change bank, was established in 1954 by the Law of Foreign Ex-
change Bank.40 The Bank of Tokyo was created with the intent
to assist foreign trade as well as to enter foreign currency trans-
actions." Other, small-scale financial institutions include re-
gional banks, mutual banks, small credit associations, agricul-
tural cooperatives, and small credit cooperatives.2
The Japanese financial industry has undergone changes
during the latter half of the 1980's. For instance, loan demand
has lessened since many companies have resolved to raising
more funds on international capital markets.43 Also, banks'
funding costs have risen due to interest rate deregulation." Fur-
thermore, the strict distinctiveness between financial institu-
tions' authorized roles have evolved due to financial liberaliza-
tion." Part of the ramifications of such changes are that the city
Burst, supra note 27, at As.
" Oda, supra note 29, at 18; see Chandler, Bubble's Burst, supra note 27, at As.
" Oda, supra note 29, at 18.
"' Rosenbluth, Political Economy, supra note 29, at 65.
39 Id. Among the trust banks are Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Mitsui. Hinterhauser,
supra note 34, at 66.
40 Oda, supra note 29, at 18.
41 Id.
" Rosenbluth, Political Economy, supra note 29, at 65. The key regional banks in-
clude the Bank of Yokahana, Hokuriku, and Chiba. Hinterhauser, supra note 34, at 66.
Among Japan's lending institutions, there are the following number in each grouping:
National and regional banks (237); Zenshinren bank (1); Shinkin banks (454); National
Federation of Credit Coop's (1); Credit Coop's (414); National Federation of Labour
Credit Association (1); Labour Credit Association (47); Shokochukin bank (1);
Norinchukin Bank (1); Agricultural Coop's (3668); and Fishery Coop's (1750). Anthony
Rowley, Japan's S & L Crisis?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 24, 1991, at 36.
" Hinterhauser, supra note 34, at 65.
44 Id.
40 Id.
19921
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banks have played a greater role in financing small- and me-
dium-sized Japanese corporations. 46 Whereas previously small-
and medium-sized Japanese banks played a key role in funding
the aforementioned clients, city banks' share of such lending
rose to 50%.47 As a result, smaller banks were forced to allocate
greater funding to securities investments, particularly invest-
ment trusts or tokkin funds. 4s Also, the city banks, despite Min-
istry of Finance rules preventing them from raising funds with
maturities greater than two years, have expanded into the arena
of the long-term credit banks and trust banks, namely long-term
financing.49
The fiscal year ending March 31, 1990 did not bring cheer-
ful news to several key sectors of Japan's financial community. 0
More specifically, Japan's city banks' pre-tax profits declined by
11.6%; seven trust banks' pre-tax profits fell by 17.2%; and the
three long-term credit banks' pre-tax profits were reduced by
14.4%.51 Particularly disheartening reports continued for Ja-
pan's city banks in the year ending March 31, 1991; in that year
pre-tax profits dropped 19.7 %.52
The strength of some Japanese banks appears to have de-
clined steadily in recent times. More specifically, the value of
the Industrial Bank of Japan's shares have decreased in value
some 24% in one week - April 1 to April 8, 1992. 51 During the
same period dramatic losses have also been witnessed at Dai-
Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd. (22%); Fuji Bank Ltd. (28%); Mitsubishi
Bank (18%); and Sanwa Bank Ltd. (23%). 54 The dramatic drop
of the value of these bank stocks is due in large measure to the
dramatic decline in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, in which these
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
o Amitabba Chowdhury, Japan: Bank Profits and Capital Ratios Take Hard
Knocks, ASIAN FIN., Aug. 15, 1990, at 36-40.
Id.
" David Lake, Japan: Banks Reel From Profit Crash, ASIAN FIN., Aug. 15, 1991, at
35-36.
" Paul Blustein, Japan Stocks Continue Their Slide, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1992, at
Cl, C2.
"Id.
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banks have heavily invested.5 Further difficulties may occur
since the need for Japanese banks to raise funds to meet the
Bank of International Settlement standards may prove costly
and arduous. 6 As a result, Japanese banks will be forced to re-
duce lending, and thereby increase the cost of funds.57
More specifically, Japanese banks had to meet the Bank for
International Settlements 8% minimum capital requirements
call by March 31, 1992.58 As a result, they raised capital by issu-
ing high-cost subordinated debt.59 Yet, as loan growth rises
slowly to 1-2%, many Japanese companies that purchased bank
shares in order to obtain favorable loans from such banks may
no longer pursue such actions.60 For instance, Daishowa Paper
recently sold 1.68 million shares of the Industrial Bank of Ja-
pan. 1 Similarly, Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance began to de-
crease the amount of various bank stocks, including the Bank of
Tokyo, that it held.2
Other dilemmas face Japanese commercial banks. More spe-
cifically, the city banks made numerous real estate loans - total-
ing approximately $11 trillion - and must negotiate with troub-
led developers, whose property values have decreased some 20-
40%.3 Additional estimates surmise that at least $110 billion in
troubled domestic loans threaten Japanese banks. Ample proof
of such hazards is Sumitomo Trust's assisting an insolvent fi-
nance company, Nippon Mortgage.6 4 Furthermore, Japanese
banks have approximately $50 billion in bad overseas loans as
well as some $15 billion in uncollectible sovereign loans to East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 5
Also, since Japanese banks must follow 8% capital ade-
Id. at C2.
56 Id.
57 Id.
Dyan Machan, Peter Fuhrman, and Andrew Tanzer, Finance Shokku, FORBES,
Apr. 13, 1992, at 42-43.
"' Id. at 42.
6O Id.
61 Id.
B2 Id.
63 Id.
" Id. at 43.
66 Id.
1992]
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quacy ratios,6" as set out by the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS), a major movement towards asset-backed securi-
tization, totaling about $100 billion, will occur.6 7 The BIS
guideline has forced banks to weigh the possibility of securitiza-
tion of their own assets.6 At the same time, since traditional
funding from banks may become limited, corporate clients will
look increasingly to both private placements and Euroyen bond
markets.6 9 Yet, significant barriers (e.g., legal, tax, and social) re-
main prior to the expansion of an asset-backed market in Ja-
pan.7" Nevertheless, some banks have begun this asset-backed
securitization with a vengeance. For example, in August 1990,
Citibank, using trade receivables of Kawasaki Steel, launched a
$500 million commercial program in the United States. Ci-
tibank's deal, which implemented "for the first time Japanese
receivables .. .assigned to a special-purpose vehicle," was ac-
cepted by many investors. 1
The Ministry of Finance's Fundamental Research Commit-
tee of the Securities and Exchange Council has acknowledged
that the legal impediments to full securitization in Japan is "the
unavoidable wave of the future. '72 Similarly, the Ministry's Fi-
nancial System Research Council declared that obstacles to
securitization must be eliminated. 7 The Ministry of Finance's
receptive attitude towards securitization was exhibited in Octo-
ber 1990 when it granted licenses to eleven firms (nine foreign,
two domestic) to trade in credit-backed securities.74 Previously,
the Ministry of Finance prohibited securities firms from dealing
" Security in Big Numbers, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1991, at 37-41 [hereinafter Security
in Big Numbers].
7 Id. at 37-38; Kenneth H. Bacon, Multinational Banks Are Likely To Face
Stricter Oversight In U.S. And Europe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1991, at A2.
" Security in Big Numbers, supra note 66, at 37-38. "Eurocurrencies are deposits in
a bank located outside the territory in which the currency is the national currency."
Dean C. Alexander, The Legal and Economic Impact of the Federal Reserve Board's
Ruling To Allow U.S. Depository Institutions To Accept Foreign Currency Deposits, 14
N.C. J. INT'L .L. & COM. REG. 459, 462 (1989) [hereinafter Alexander, Deposits]. See gen-
erally EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES, supra note 8, at 25-30.
69 Security in Big Numbers, supra note 66, at 37.
70 Id. at 38.
71 Id.
71 Id. at 40.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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in asset-backed securities because they were not considered
securities. 5
The securities industry is largely dominated by four securi-
ties houses - Nikko, Yamaichi, Daiwa, and Nomura. The "Big
'Four" are the largest traders and retailers of securities and make
up about three-quarters of all bond and stock issues. 76
The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) has undergone a number
of changes over the years. For instance, activity on the TSE fluc-
tuated from an average of 428 million shares traded daily in
1985 to 1,035 in 1988, and subsequently declined to 500 million
in I990.77 Various forms of deregulation were exhibited at the
" Id. See Yoshiki Shimada, A Comparison of Securities Regulation in Japan and
the United States, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1991).
7' Rosenbluth, Political Economy, supra note 29, at 66.
Among the reasons for success by the Big Four are several-fold. First, after
World War II, Japan's securities industry was fairly undeveloped. Consequently,
the Ministry of Finance adopted policies that would protect Japanese securities
firms. By the latter half of the 1950s, the Ministry of Finance had chosen the Big
Four as securities firms that it would give priority (such as permitting the Big
Four preference in opening branches). Second, the fixed commission systems for
brokering, underwriting, and investment trust fees enabled the Big Four to secure
its position without worrying about competition regarding the aforementioned
fees. Third, the Big Four benefitted from their influence in obtaining Ministry of
Finance approval for new products. Fourth, the Big Four played a key role in
assisting the Ministry of Finance to gather information about the stock market.
Shigeki Kakinuma, Omnipotent Big Four, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, December 1988, at 12-17.
" Todd Harris, The Deregulation Dance, Bus. TOKYO, June 1991, at 48, 49.
During the second half of the 1980s, the Tokyo market's dizzying rise enabled
Japanese companies to raise 85 trillion yen - about $620 billion at current ex-
change rates - on extraordinarily favorable terms. They were often able to borrow
at interest rates in the 1 percent to 2 percent range by issuing bonds with the
option of converting them into stock - an attractive lure as long as Tokyo's market
seemed headed out of sight.
The virtually free capital helped spur a Japanese corporate splurge on plants
and equipment and research and development that, by its sheer size, left Ameri-
can industry in the dust.
Despite an economy that is about three-fifths the size of the United States',
Japan's capital spending totaled about $660 billion in 1990, nearly 25 percent
more than the amount spent by U.S. firms.
But now, interest rates in Japan and the United States are much closer than
before and the U.S. stock market is hovering at near-record heights. Result: The
Japanese funding advantage has all but disappeared, many analysts contend.
Paul Blustein, Tokyo Market Facing Eclipse, WASH. POST, Sept. 1 1991, at Hi [hereinaf-
ter, Blustein, Eclipse]. See Quentin Hardy, Nikkei Resumes Its Course, Losing 3.44%,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1992, at C1, C12.
1992]
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TSE. For instance, in 1985, a TSE futures bond market arose.78
In 1988, stock index trading, termed the Nikkei 225,79 took
form.80 Moreover, the TSE has been a leader in integrating in-
ternational stock and futures trading.8 1
During the first half of 1990, reduced profits among the Big
Four were staggering: Nikko was down 74.2%; Nomura was
down 55.1%; Yamaichi was down 74.2%; and Daiwa was down
59.6%.82 In addition, four of the second-tier Japanese securities
firms experienced profit decreases by over 70%.83 There were
several reasons for these losses.8 4 First, equity brokerage com-
missions, which constitute the Big Four's largest source of prof-
its, declined significantly.8 5 Second, the temporary suspension on
securities firms to underwrite public offerings of convertible and
warrant bonds and stocks eliminated a previously profitable sec-
tor. 8 This temporary suspension, which was aimed at eliminat-
ing new securities from entering an overextended market, caused
a two-thirds decline in~underwriting commission charges for
78 Harris, supra note 77, at 48-49.
7 Alexander, Deposits, supra note 68, at 465; Machan, supra note 58.
80 Harris, supra note 77, at 48-49.
8' Id.; Alexander, Deposits, supra note 68, at 465-66. See TAKEJI YAMASHITA, JAPAN'S
SECURITIES MARKETS A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (1989); Norman Sklarewitz, How To List
On The Tokyo Stock Exchange: Why List? For Fame And A Good Staff, EUROMONEY,
Jan. 1988, at 5-7; Hidetoshi Miyamoto, The Role of Securities In Japan's Financial
Market, Bus. JAPAN, Jan. 1987, at 49, 51.
8" Tony Shale, The Big Four Take A Beating, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1991, at 38-41
[hereinafter Shale, The Big Four]. See James Sterngold, A Financial Giant's Slippery
Slope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at F1, F6 [hereinafter Sterngold, Giant].
[E]ven for a formidable global colossus like Nomura - it has a staggering $14.7
billion in equity behind it, four-and-a-half times as much as Merrill Lynch &
Company, America's largest brokerage house - these are trying times. The firm's
profits are expected to plunge up to 60% in the fiscal year ending March 31
[19911, from $2.1 billion the previous year [1990].
Id. See also James C. Hyatt, Debts of Japanese Securities Firms Are Downgraded,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1992, at Cll.
83 Shale, The Big Four, supra note 82, at 40.
84 Id.
88 Id. See also Sterngold, Giant, supra note 82, at F6 (graph, "Commissions on the
sale of securities as a percentage of worldwide fiscal revenue" was 41% for Nomura, 16%
for Shearson, and 15% for Merrill Lynch.) "Bowing to foreign pressure, trading costs
have been gradually reduced. The TSE cut brokerage commission rates 9.1% in 1986 and
an additional 7% in June 1990. But unlike New York and London, it has stopped short
of deregulating fixed commissions - cash cows for the Big Four brokerage houses ....
Harris, supra note 77, at 48.
8" Shale, The Big Four, supra note 82, at 40.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/11
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Nikko, Daiwa, and Yamaichi.87 Third, significant declines in the
lead-managing of Eurobonds among the Big Four were wit-
nessed in 1990. As a result, these four institutions, which had
38% of the head positions in a Eurobond syndication in 1989,
held only 20% in 1990.88 Fourth, the Big Four have witnessed
significant declines in their investment trust sales.89 Investment
trust sales, which account for approximately 10% of operating
income, will continue to fall, since investors still fear a repeat of
the huge losses they suffered in the October 1987 crash."0
In 1991, it was determined that the Ministry of Finance
would permit the Industrial Bank of Japan, Long-Term Credit
Bank, and Nippon Credit Bank (all long-term credit banks) to
carry out securities underwriting, in addition to other securities-
related activities."' Other institutions that would be permitted
to delve into the securities industry include the twelve city
banks.
On April 8, 1992, the Tokyo Stock Exchange's Nikkei 225
Stock Index lost 3.5% to 17,791.55, marking its lowest level since
November 27, 1986.2 The weakness in the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change is further evidenced by the more than 50% decrease in
its value since the end of 1989."3 In addition, volume on the Ex-
change, which in 1989 sometimes reached 3 billion shares a day,
reached 300 million shares only once in 1992.1" This apparent
gloom among investors has been demonstrated by Nomura Re-
search Institute's recent recommendation for customers to "sell"
87 Id.
Id. Nomura Securities
retained its No. 1 ranking last year for underwritings in the Euromarket, the
fourth straight year it has held the top spot. But its market share was slashed
almost in half, to less than 9 percent. In Tokyo, it was late in taking up the
newest imported fad, computerized program trading, and thus finds itself a
distant fourth in the lucrative activity - behind three American securities
houses.
Sterngold, Giant, supra note 81, at Fl.
8' Shale, The Big Four, supra note 82, at 41.
"Id. at 40.
' Id. at 41.
:2 James Sterngold, Stock Fall In Japan Worsens, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 1992, at D1
[hereinafter Sterngold, Stock Fall Worsens].
" Id.
Quentin Hardy, Nomura Analysts Break Tradition By Giving Investors The Bad
News, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1992, at C1, C6.
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several Japanese stocks. 5 Such recommendations are particu-
larly unusual in that generally Japanese securities firms have
suggested clients to either "buy" or "hold"."
Consequently, the Japanese Government has taken steps to
spur the economy and the Exchange. More specifically, the Gov-
ernment has accelerated public spending, and the Bank of Japan
has cut interest rates. 7 Also, in order to decrease the instability
and weakness in the Exchange, the Ministry of Finance allegedly
requested large Japanese stockholders, including insurance com-
panies, to refrain from lending shares to various short-term sell-
ers.9 8 The Ministry of Finance is concerned that these short-
term sellers, who sell the borrowed stock and subsequently hope
to repurchase it as its price falls, are encouraging losses in insur-
ance companies' stock holdings.9
In another vein, the cornerstone of the debate on the possi-
ble changes to Japan's financial markets is found in Article 65 of
the Securities and Exchange Law. 100 That Article provides that
trust companies, life insurance companies, and banks may not
enter the securities business as brokers, dealers, or underwrit-
ers.101 Japanese securities firms oppose the modification of Arti-
cle 65, but would support some adjustments that would enable
them to enter into the foreign exchange business. 02 Also, given
recent scandals that have hit Japanese securities firms, they ap-
pear to lack the capital and desire to challenge the major city
banks in the general banking business area.'0 3
During the Spring of 1991, two advisory reports on potential
liberalization in Japan's financial sector were presented to the
Ministry of Finance for review.'0 4 In May 1991, the Securities
and Exchange Council issued a report (Royama Report) in
Id. at C16.
Steingold, Stock Fall Worsens, supra note 92, at D1.
97 Quentin Hardy, Nikkei Resumes Its Course, Losing 3.4%, WALL ST. J., April 14,
1992, at C1, C12.
" Id. at C12.
" Id.
100 Tetsuya Morimoto & William J. Seiter, Japan's Financial System Reform:
Stalled on the Tracks, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 1991, at 30.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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which it warned that entry by Japanese banks into the securities
business must be carried out slowly."°5 The Royama Report, in
comments paralleling those of the Japan Securities Dealers As-
sociation, emphasized that the purposes underlying Article 65's
opposition to bank interference in the securities business - "(i)
maintaining the financial health of the banking system; (ii)
preventing conflicts of interest between the bank's role as lender
[and] its role as underwriter or equityholder; and (iii) circum-
venting market domination of the securities sector by the largest
banks through their immense economic power over corporate cli-
ents" - are key principles that must be upheld.10 6 Conse-
quently, the Royama Report suggests that while parent bank
participation in the private placement business should continue,
banks should not carry out other securities business at the par-
ent company level.10 7 Yet, the Royama Report recommends al-
lowing banks to conduct some underwriting business by subsidi-
aries holding licenses to engage in the securities business.0 8 In
doing so, banks will face greater competition, particularly from
the Big Four. Yet, because in the past Japanese commercial
banks had much influence over their customers, the Royama Re-
port suggests that scrutiny of the securities subsidiaries of such
banks for their clients' securities issuances is necessary. 109
Next, the Royama Report addresses the issue of stock-
brokering. The Report determines that neither parent banks nor
their newly-established securities subsidiaries should be permit-
ted to act as brokers. 1 0 The rationale for this discussion is two-
fold: the small securities firms' reliance on brokering as their key
source of income and the extensive corporate holdings of Japa-
nese commercial banks."' The Royama Report also addresses
the role of securitization of products (e.g., mortgage-backed and
receivables-backed securities, commercial paper)."1 In addition,
the Royama Report opines that to change the narrow definition
:05 Id.
06 Id. at 31.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"I Id.
112 Id.
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of "securities" in Japan's Securities and Exchange Law must
change to a non-exhaustive definition that would include various
financial products as well as corporate stocks and bonds. 113 Yet,
commercial banks fear such a change may limit their capacity to
carry out transactions in securitization-related instruments at
the parent level without encroaching Article 65 of the Securities
and Exchange Law.114
In June 1991, the Financial System Research Council's Sys-
tem Problems Specialist Committee issued a report (FSRC Re-
port) describing potential structural changes to Japan's financial
institutions." 5 The basic tenets of the FSRC Report included:
"relaxing the existing bar on cross-entry among the securities,
banking and trust banking fields, . . . [and allowing for] op-
tional conversion of Japan's specialized long-term credit banks
. . . foreign exchange banks . . . [and] regular banks."11 6
Regarding the form of entry, the FSRC Report suggests that
commercial banks, trust banks, and securities companies recip-
rocally could enter each others businesses by using three types
of subsidiary companies: "securities subsidiaries licensed under
SEL [Securities and Exchange Law]; banking subsidiaries li-
censed under the Banking Law; and trust banking subsidiaries
licensed under the Banking Law; and holding trust business ap-
proval under the Law Concerning Concurrent Trust Business by
Regular Banks.1117 As a result of these proposed changes, Japa-
nese commercial banks would be able to work in the securities
business by utilizing a subsidiary corporation.11 8 Another key
point of the FSRC Report is that distinct capital and net asset
requirements would depend on the securities business carried
out by subsidiaries. 1 9
There are other structural approaches to the integration of
securities firms, commercial banks, and trust banks. 2 ' First,
under the sogo noriire (mutual convergence) approach, these
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
"a Id.
119 Id.
... Id. at 32.
[Vol. 4:271
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/11
REGULATION IN JAPAN
banks would be permitted to engage in each other's businesses
at the parent company level.12 1 Second, under the universal
banking scenario, financial institutions would be empowered to
participate as commercial banks, investment banks, and trust
banks."'2 As such, it follows the European model of a single fi-
nancial institution with multi-level powers.'23 Although the Min-
istry of Finance has generally opposed the universal banking
concept, its attributes - simplicity in its application - are use-
ful.' 24 Third, a special-law investment bank proposal would cre-
ate a new type of investment bank which would be limited to
wholesale financial transactions, and would be authorized to
carry out various activities from long-term and short-term fi-
nance to trust and securities business.'2 5 Fourth, a financial ser-
vices holding company approach would have limited securities
business activities through non-banking affiliates. 2 '
Upon reviewing the FSRC Report and the Royama Report,
it appears that ultimately some changes to Article 65 of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act will occur. Recent scandals'27 in the
Japanese securities business strengthens the pressure by the
banking industry to reform Article 65.
Lastly, the Japanese postal system, administered by the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), contains a
savings system with a deposit base larger than any in the world:
100 trillion yen.' 28 The postal system provides higher interest
rates and more beneficial terms than non-banks. 2 ' In 1986, the
share of the personal savings market by form in Japan was as
follows: the postal savings system held 30.9%; city banks 17.9%;
mutual banks 6.9%; credit associations 11.6%; agricultural coop-
eratives 12.3%; and others 6.1%.111
:21 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
:,5 Id.
126 Id.
127 See infra Part III.
:,8 ROSENBLUTH, CONTEMPORARY, supra note 29, at 167-68.
' Id.
130 Id. at 181.
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III. FINANCIAL SCANDAL IN JAPAN
Recent revelations regarding questionable and illegal prac-
tices in the Japanese financial community merit close atten-
tion.13 1 The major financial scandals that have been prevalent in
the United States in recent years similarly have surfaced in Ja-
pan.132 In April 1989, three banks, Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuji, and
Mitsui, were ordered by Japan's National Tax Administration to
pay 1.58 billion yen for their inaccurate announcement of off-
shore subsidiaries' profits. 33 Also, in 1989, it was discovered that
between 1975 and 1984 Daiwa Securities unlawfully gave over
twenty corporate customers yield guarantees on ten billion yen
of investments.134
The recognition of the extent of scandal in some areas of
the Japanese financial industry grew in the 1990's. In particular,
in October 1990, four employees at Mitsui Trust & Bank alleg-
edly did not tell tax authorities that they had earned 1.8 billion
yen in securities trading by using inside information.'3  During
that same month, Atinori Yamashita, a former manager of the
Aobadi branch of Sumitomo Bank, was charged with persuading
the Bank's "clients to lend . . . 43.9 billion [yen] to groups spec-
ulating in stocks and illegally guaranteed the clients high short-
term returns in the process."'3 6 If the allegations are proved, Mr.
13' T.R. Reid, Japan's Scandalous Summer of '91, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1991, at
A18.
188 See Charles R. Babcock, Helms Report Urges Censure Of Cranston in "Keating
5" Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1991, at A4; Rudolph A. Pyatt, Jr., BCCI Case Raises
Questions About the Very Integrity of U.S. Banking Laws, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1991,
at B14; George Lardner, Jr., CIA Probed, Used BCCI, Official Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 3,
1991, at Al.
188 Tony Shale, Sumitomo's Dangerous Liaisons, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1990, at 16-17
[hereinafter Shale, Sumitomo].
184 Id. at 17. See James Sterngold, Prominent Speculator Is Indicted in Japanese
Stock Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at D10.
88 Shale, Sumitomo, supra note 75, at 17.
130 Id. at 16. More specifically, Mr. Akinori Yamashita is accused of promising
high returns on loans from three bank clients worth. .. 11.4 billion [yen] which
he, in his personal capacity, funnelled to the Koshin speculator group, led by 53
year-old Mitsuhiro Kotani, between March and September 1988. He is also ac-
cused of repeating the process on two later occasions by channeling loans worth
... 32.5 billion [yen] to the Seibi group, led by Akira Kato, between March and
June 1990.
Id. at 16.
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Yamashita violated the Law Concerning the Regulation of Re-
ceiving Capital Subscriptions, Deposits, and Interest on Depos-
its. 137 Generally, this legislation "prohibits employees of finan-
cial companies from engaging in loan transactions for third
parties outside the jurisdiction of their firms."138 Yet, the sanc-
tions for such appear to be rather mild - only a fine.13 9
Within days of the arrest of Mr. Yamashita, Sumitomo
Bank Chairman Ichiro Isoda resigned from his post, noting: "It
is extremely regrettable that such a crime has been committed
by a former branch manager of a bank with great public obliga-
tions. It is natural for the head to take responsibility. '" 1,0 Yet,
numerous "well-placed observers in Tokyo" suggest that Mr.
Isoda was pressured to resign "by a high-ranking politician or by
the emissaries of the ruling bureaucracy at the Ministry of
Finance."'
During the summer of 1991, a number of other financial
scandals were uncovered. On June 21, 1991, Nomura Securities
International, Inc. and Nikko Securities Company admitted
compensating its key clients more than $100 million for losses
made in the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1990.142 More specifically,
Yasuhiro Mizuuchi, a Nomura vice president, explained that his
company paid a number of institutional investors approximately
$114 million in compensation for securities trading losses.""
Similarly, Masao Yuki, a Nikko vice president, stated that his
"s Id. at 17.
138 Id.
1,9 Id.
140 Id.
341 Id. In particular, these well-placed observers suggest:
that the politician, ex-prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, intervened because he
feared that his links in the past with Kotani [a securities speculator group] would
drag his name into the affair. And they [observers] believe that MOF wanted to
punish Sumitomo for being, in its eyes, a disobedient upstart whose over-aggres-
sive strategy and practices had begun to rock the Japanese banking boat. If the
MOF could also shift the blame for the negative social effects of stock and real-
estate market speculation onto Sumitomo, then it would have achieved a double
victory.
Id.
1d* Paul Blustein, 2 Major Japanese Securities Firms Concede Favoritism to Big
Clients, WASH. POST, June 22, 1991, at D1 [hereinafter Blustein, Firms Concede
Favoritism].
140 Id.
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firm had compensated key investors more than $120 million for
securities trading losses. 144 Essentially, Nomura and Nikko pur-
chased, at inflated prices, securities from their customers, who
had lost money on these investments. 14 5 In Japan, this manner
of compensation would have been illegal only if the securities
firm previously had agreed to reimburse its customer for his
losses. 4
In addition, Japanese securities firms acknowledged that
they engaged in business with the Japanese crime syndicate."'
In particular, Nikko and Nomura acknowledged that they pro-
vided loans of approximately $250 million to Susumu Ishii, a
former leader of Inagawa-Kai, a part of the Japanese under-
world. 4" However, these securities firms proffer that they were
unaware of their ties to this Japanese group "until it was too
late. 1' 4  Sadly, this admission by Nomura and Nikko has
demonstrated that the Japanese syndicate has diversified "their
traditional rackets such as prostitution and extortion by getting
into the stock and real estate markets.
1 50
The shadow that was now setting on Nomura and Nikko
caused the firms to take immediate action.15' Soon, Yoshihisa
Tabuchi, Nomura's president, resigned in order to take responsi-
"' Id. at D4.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
141 Id. at Dl.
Ishii used the money [from the securities firms] to buy a substantial stake in
Tokyu Corp., a real estate and railroad company, Nomura helped drive up
Tokyu's shares, boosting the value of Ishii's investment by more than 50 percent
at the end of 1989. Nomura acknowledged that it had actively trade[d] Tokyu
shares, but said it had done so because it was recommending the company to cli-
ents. The Tokyo Stock Exchange has reportedly launched an investigation of the
trading in Tokyu shares.
Id. Also, Nomura Securities Co. and Nikko Securities Co. allegedly "bought some $29
million worth of golf memberships from Susumu Ishii ... perhaps to compensate him
for losses." Karen Lowry Miller, Goodfellas, Japanese-Style: Well-Connected and 20%
Legit, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 1991, at 44. See Yomiko Ono & Clay Chandler, Mobster's
Death Robs Authorities Of Key Witness In Japan Scandals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1991,
at A5D.
149 Paul Blustein, Heads of 2 Japanese Securities Firms Quit, WASH. POST, June 25,
1991, at Cl [hereinafter Blustein, Heads of Securities Firms].
150 Id.
161 Id.
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bility "for damaging investors' confidence in the equity mar-
ket.' 152 Tabuchi explained, "[n]o securities firm should ever
compensate any customer for stock losses."' 53 Similarly, Takuya
Iwasaki, president of Nikko, stepped down from his position in
order to apologize "to the society and industry.'
54
In July 1991, the Japanese financial scandal was exposed
even further. A leading Tokyo newspaper, Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, released "the names of 228 corporations and pension
funds including some of the country's most prestigious firms -
that were secretly refunded about $950 million in trading losses
on their brokerage accounts."' 55 Among the reimbursement ben-
eficiaries were leading Japanese companies, including Nissan
Motors Co., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., and Hitachi
Ltd.'"6 These large companies are among brokerage firms' im-
portant clients,' 57 and consequently the compensation was easy
to surmise. At the same time, it was discovered that a number of
smaller players received compensation, including small compa-
nies, savings banks, credit unions, and individuals.'15 Some sug-
gest that this support of small Japanese companies by securities
firms was due to Japanese government policy that brokers assist
"small customers so they would not face bankruptcy.' ' s Thus,
there is speculation that the Japanese government's involvement
in the scandal is wider than previously suggested.16 0
152 Id.
153 Paul Blustein, Japanese Scandal Widens, WASH. POST, July 23, 1991, at D1
[hereinafter Blustein, Japanese Scandal Widens].
:54 Blustein, Heads of Securities Firms, supra note 149, at C1.
18 T.R. Reid, Japan Stock Scandal Beneficiaries Identified, WASH. POST, July 30,
1991, at.E1 [hereinafter Reid, Japan Stock Scandal].
188 Id. "The big firms, known . . .as oh-guchi, or 'big-mouth' investors - Japan's
equivalent of 'fat-cat' - are the kind of important customers that brokerage firms would
clearly want to satisfy." Id. "Hitachi Ltd.'s stock market investments, for example, were
all but insured by Nomura. As the scandals have now exposed, the broker forked out $16
million to cover over the last couple of years." Robert Neff, Hidden Japan The Scandals
Start To Reveal How The System Really Works, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 1991, at 34.
157 Reid, Japanese Stock Scandal, supra note 155, at El.
188 Id.
59 Id.
160 Id.
Bureaucrats play a confusing role as both coddlers and regulators of indus-
try .... Indeed, the Japanese have refined back-room dealing to an art. One
expression of this is the zoku - informal 'tribes' of Diet members from the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who watch out for different interest groups and
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The scandal involving compensating investors for securities
trading losses widened to include eighteen second-tier Japanese
securities firms."' More specifically, in August 1991, four sec-
ond-tier Japanese securities firms admitted that they had com-
pensated their clients for securities losses to a total of 874 mil-
lion yen ($6.4 million) over an eighteen-month period that ended
in March 1990.162 The four brokerage firms involved in this ac-
tivity were Aizawa Securities Co., Izumi Securities Co., Meiko
Securities Co., and Naigal Securities Co. 163 First, Aizawa Securi-
ties Co. acknowledged that it compensated "15 companies, in-
cluding Fuji Bank Ltd. and Nippon Trust Bank, Ltd., and fifty-
eight individuals a total of 128 million yen." '64 Second, Naigal
Securities Co. distributed 481 million yen in compensation to
Komatsu Ltd.'s Komatsu Finance Co. unit (receiving the highest
amount); Nippon Credit Bank (35 million yen); Mitsubishi Corp.
(19 million yen); and Hitachi Ltd. (10 million yen). 165 Third,
Meiko Securities stated that it provided its European subsidiary
and eight persons 104 million yen in compensation. 16 Fourth,
Izumi Securities Co. "paid five companies, including two credit
associations, a total of 161 million yen in compensation."' 67
On August 26, 1991, Japanese Finance Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto, speaking before a Japan parliamentary panel inves-
tigating the securities scandal, acknowledged that "his agency
had known since 1983 that Japanese brokerage firms were com-
pensating favored clients for stock trading losses, but merely ad-
vised them to avoid the practice."'6 8 An economist at the Mit-
subishi Research Institute emphasized that the "MOF knew all
intercede deftly when necessary.
Neff, supra note 156, at 35.
181 Blustein, Japanese Scandal Widens, supra note 153, at D4.
Four More Japanese Brokerage Houses Identify Clients Compensated For
Losses, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at A5B.
163 Id.
1 Id. "Fuji bank, which Aizawa Securities listed as having received 30 million yen,
said the compensation was made through a discretionary account controlled entirely by
the brokerage house. . . . Nippon Trust Bank expressed surprise at being included on
the list, which said the bank received six million yen." Id.
16 Id.
188 Id.
167 Id.
18 Japan Disclosure In Scandal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1991, at A6 [hereinafter Ja-
pan Disclosure].
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about [the payback schemes] but didn't do a thing."'169 More-
over, in a 1984 Annual Report, the Ministry of Finance disclosed
that the compensation practice was limited. 170 Only in December
1989, a Ministry of Finance guideline hinted that the use of such
payments should be avoided.17 ' The impact of this guideline was
of little consequence. 1 2 After all, a former Nomura Securities
Co. trader explained, the "MOF would find out about paybacks
and warn the securities firms. The firms would promise to stop
and then do the same thing all over again."' 73 Discussing the
role of the MOF in the securities enforcement area, an executive
of a medium-sized securities firm proffers that the Japanese gov-
ernment's practice of sanctioning firms and subsequently having
the securities firms hire former MOF officials signifies the MOF
is sometimes highly unethical.' 74 Due to the growing view that
the revolving-door and close relationship between the securities
firms and the MOF is improper, Mitsuya Matsukawa, chairman
of Nikko Securities Co.'s research institute, suggests such ties
are on the decline. 17 5
The economic reverberations of this scandal will soon be un-
derstood by the Big Four: "More than 125 public organizations
and utilities reportedly have announced that they will stop do-
ing business [with the big four].' 7 6 Moreover, small investors
may now view the Tokyo Stock Exchange "as rigged in favor of
the big players.' 77 In addition, the effects of suspicions of inter-
locking commitments in the Japanese stock market are quite
real. 7 8 For instance, in September 1991, The World Bank re-
Shoji, supra note 25, at 4.
170 Japan Disclosure, supra note 168, at A6.
171 Id.; Shoji, supra note 25, at 4.
12 Shoji, supra note 25, at 4.
"7s Id. "Japan's financial sector operates on shady guidelines. That includes MOF,
says Keisuke Inaba, president of UBS Philips & Drew International in Tokyo." Id.
174 Id.
170 Blustein, Eclipse, supra note 77, at H1. Professor Shoici Royama of Osaka Uni-
versity suggests that observers of the MOF fall into two groups. "One sees the govern-
ment with the power and control: MOF decides, and the banks and securities houses
follow. . . .The other group views MOF as a captive audience, reacting to private and
noncompetitive pressure." Lake, supra note 21, at 46,
176 Blustein, Japanese Scandal Widens, supra note 153, at D4.
177 Blustein, Firms Concede Favoritism, supra note 142, at Dl.
"' Paul Blustein, In Japan, A Market Dominated By Insiders, WASH. Pos', June
26, 1991, at F3.
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moved Nomura Securities Company and Nikko Securities Com-
pany from a billion-dollar -bond underwriting group because of
their alleged ties to the Japanese syndicate. 179 Furthermore, due
to their alleged illicit activities Japanese securities firms may
face civil law suits, including those by U.S. pension funds.'
Similarly, Nobuhiko Matsuno, Director-General of the Min-
istry of Finance's Securities Bureau, expressed before a special
committee of the Upper House of Japan's Diet (parliament),
that transgressions of securities firms are of a larger scale than
previously believed. 81 In particular, Mr. Matsuno discussed the
allegations that the Nomura Securities Co. manipulated stock
prices and compensated clients. 82 Whereas earlier the Ministry
of Finance suggested that various securities firms failed to com-
ply with legally non-binding Ministry of Finance directives,
there is increasing evidence that Nomura manipulated the stock
value of Tokyu Corporation for the Japanese syndicate.18 3 Also,
Mr. Matsuno proffered that Japanese securities firms had also
reimbursed clients, who had not lost money, thereby illegally
Approximately 70 percent of the stock of major Japanese companies is held by
other companies in a web of cross ownership aimed at providing firms with 'stable'
stockholders, which are usually business allies as well. Companies buy each other's
shares not solely for obtaining high profits on their investments, but also to bene-
fit from gaining a reliable customer or supplier, or banker.
Id. Nevertheless, "all stock markets are basically run by and for the benefit of big
wheeler-dealers and investment funds - even when securities firms are not giving illegal
rebates." Hobart Rowen, Scandal, Japanese Style: Looking The Other Way, WASH.
POST., June 30, 1991, at H1.
179 World Bank Group Drops 2 Japanese Securities Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1991, at D16.
180 James A. White, Pension Funds Are Urged To Sue Japanese Brokers, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 28, 1991, at C1. "In an unusual mass solicitation conducted last week, Coudert
[Brothers] lawyers made a pitch to a Manhattan hotel meeting room packed with repre-
sentatives of pension funds holding combined assets of some $ 300 billion." Id.
"' Clay Chandler, Japan Finance Minister's Harsher Tone Suggests New Suspi-
cions of Wrongdoing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1991, at A14 [hereinafter Chandler, Wrongdo-
ing]. "Last month, examiners from the ministry's compliance division launched surprise
raids on the headquarters of the nation's four largest securities companies; their inspec-
tion of documents from the firms is continuing." Id.
182 Id.
"I Id. "'We are paying attention to the fact that Nomura recommended buying
Tokyu shares soon after massive purchases by criminal organizations,' Mr. Matsuno said.
'At this moment, we can't prove Nomura purposely drove up share prices so the criminal
organizations could sell at high prices, but we have a suspicion.'" Id.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/11
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guaranteeing profits.1 84 More specifically, Mr. Matsuno noted
fifty-nine cases in which compensation may have been paid by
the securities firms.
18 5
In addition to a Ministry of Finance investigation into
Nomura's activities in Tokyu Corporation stock, the Ministry of
Justice's criminal division is studying this matter. '86 The sanc-
tions available to the Ministry of Justice if Nomura is deter-
mined "to have engaged in manipulation, a criminal offense, the
individuals involved could be sentenced to three-year prison
terms and the firm could face an array of harsh administrative
measures . . . includ[ing] suspensions or even the revocation of
its operating license."1 87 Moreover, Japanese securities law for-
bids brokerage firms from promising to compensate customer
losses in advance.18 8 To reiterate, compensation may occur if no
decision to provide such money is made in advance.1 89 Also, as
stated earlier, in December 1989 the Ministry of Finance had
already "issued a nonbinding directive . . . warning securities
firms against paying compensation."' 90
Furthermore, the breadth of customer compensation by the
Big Four was better understood following the testimony of top
officials of these securities firms before the Special Commit-
tee."8' Earlier, when allegations of wrongdoing by the Big Four
arose, they admitted that during a two-and-one-half year period
that ended March 1990, they provided some clients with com-
pensation for losses suffered in stock trading.'92 Yet, former
president of Nomura Securities, Setsuya Tabuchi, suggested
that the Ministry of Finance has alleged that compensation to
clients may have continued after March 1990.'"' Also, Mr.
184 Id.
185 Yuri Kageyama, Japanese: More Gained In Scandal, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1991,
at El.
I8 James Sterngold, Nomura Inquiry Reopened Amid Additional Findings, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991, at Dl [hereinafter Sterngold, Inquiry Reopened].
187 Id.
188 Sterngold, Inquiry Reopened, supra note 186, at D18.
189 Id.
190 Yumiko Ono, Big Four Officials In Japan Admit Wider Compensation Pay-
ments, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1991, at All.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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Tabuchi claimed that it was Nomura's compensated clients who
must have known about the paybacks. 194 Similarly, the president
of Daiwa Securities Company, Masahiro Dozen, acknowledged
that there existed cases of client compensation that occurred af-
ter March 1990.1' In addition, Nikko Securities' former presi-
dent, Takuya Iwasaki, admitted that his firm had sold shares of
a speculative stock, Honshu Paper Company, to Susumu Ishii
during October-November 1990.196 Yet, Mr. Iwasaki stressed
that his firm neither recommended the purchase nor financed
the sale. 19 7
On September 24, 1991, Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Minister of
Finance, suspended Japan's Big Four securities firms from par-
ticipating in Japanese government bond auctions for one
month.9 8 If the auctions proceeded as expected, the Big Four
would miss three auctions of government bonds-those matur-
ing in ten years, six months, and three months. 199 Apparently,
the Ministry of Finance was determined to assign these sanc-
tions after the Big Four acknowledged that since April 1990 they
had provided eighty major clients with more than $325 million
to compensate them for securities trading losses.200 In particular,
the Ministry of Finance argued that its December 1989 adminis-
trative guidance against such compensation was willfully ignored
by the Big Four.20 1 As Kichiro Takao, the president of Nikko
19' Id. See Nomura Wrongly Promoted Shares President Admits, WALL ST. J., Sept.
8, 1991, at A18.
195 Ono, supra note 190, at All.
190 Id.
197 Id.
" Paul Blustein, 'Big Four' Bond Trading Suspended, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1991,
at C2 [hereinafter Blustein, Bond Trading]; Quentin Hardy & Clay Chandler, Four Jap-
anese Broker Firms Disciplined, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1991, at Cl [hereinafter Hardy &
Chandler]; James Sterngold, New Penalty Is Planned For Japan Brokerages, N.Y.
TrMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at D6 [hereinafter Sterngold, New Penalty]. The Big Four were
sanctioned with "a four-day suspension from brokerage activities in July [1991]". Blu-
stein, Bond Trading, supra, at C2.
' Hardy & Chandler, supra note 198, at C14.
00 Blustein, Bond Trading, supra note 198, at C2. "Daiwa, the second-largest of the
Big Four, admitted today to compensating clients about $176 million since April 1990.
Yamaichi confessed to paying about $123 million during the period; Nikko acknowledged
paying $24.6 million; and Nomura, the world's largest securities firm, admitted to paying
$3 million."
'0' Id. "But critics have asserted that the powerful ministry must have known of the
compensation practice and decided to turn a blind eye to it to help the firms protect
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Securities Company, admitted, "'[ilt is wrong that we ignored
the Finance Ministry's directive. We failed in making all em-
ployees strictly follow the directive.' "1202
This suspension harms the Big Four's reputation.203 Never-
theless, due to the Big Four's dominance in Japanese govern-
ment and corporate underwriting, the Ministry of Finance can-
not keep them out of the auctions for an extended period.2 0 "
After all, as Alica Ogawa, a financial analyst at S.G. Warburg
Securities Ltd. in Tokyo surmises, "'[there isn't any infrastruc-
ture to replace them.' "9205
Bad news continued for Japan's financial industry when on
September 30, 1991 the Ministry of Finance formally accused
Nomura Securities Company of violating "an article of the se-
curities law prohibiting 'excessive sales recommendations' as
well as a 1974 guideline urging securities companies to run their
businesses in consideration of their clients' best interests."20 s
This accusation was based on a stock scheme, discussed earlier,
in which Nomura allegedly "arranged for an affiliated company
to provide more than $100 million in financing to a gangster,
Susumu Ishii, and then to have helped him accumulate more
than twenty-seven million shares in the Tokyu Corporation
.... "207 Next, Nomura apparently "issued a strong buy recom-
mendation for Tokyu and held seminars in October 1989, in
which top executives pushed the stock heavily. ' 208 Subsequently,
Nomura's offices supposedly acquired a large number of buy or-
ders. As a result, the price of Tokyu Company's stock doubled
during the autumn of 1989.209 Soon afterwards, Mr. Ishii alleg-
edly unloaded a large portion of his Tokyu Company stock at
their relationships with their clients."
: Sterngold, New Penalty, supra note 198, at D6.
03 Hardy & Chandler, supra note 198, at C1. Marshall Gittler, bond market analyst
at UBS Phillips & Drew International Ltd. suggests "'The people in charge of supervis-
ing them are saying they won't deal with them.'"
204 Id.
:0" Id.
" Quentin Hardy, Tokyo Agency Curbs Nomura's Stock Trading, WALL ST. J., Oct.
1, 1991, at A16. See James Sterngold, Japan Accuses Nomura of Stock-Price Scheme,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1991, at D2 [hereinafter Sterngold, Nomura].
201 Sterngold, Nomura, supra note 206, at D2.
20 Id.
209 Id.
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inflated prices.210 Rather quickly, Tokyu's share price fell, caus-
ing most of the securities firm's customers losses.211
Due to its actions in the Tokyu Corporation stock manipu-
lation scheme, the Ministry of Finance ordered Nomura Securi-
ties Company to shut down seventy-nine domestic offices for one
month as well as eight other branches for six weeks.212 In addi-
tion, Nomura was ordered to close down its research division
and to stop trading on its own account for one month.21" Also,
Nomura's suspension for underwriting government bonds was
extended through November 1991.214 Nomura's president, Hideo
Sakamaki, acknowledged the firm's wrongdoing and apologized
for causing the firm's clients so much trouble. 215 This latest ad-
monishment by the Ministry of Finance of Nomura's activities
will likely tarnish its image. 21 As one executive at a foreign se-
curities firm in Japan noted, Nomura is "going to feel this one,
both at home and overseas, where a lot of people are wondering
if they should be doing business with these kinds of people. 21 7
In fact, due to the scandal, profits at the Big Four and vari-
ous medium-sized firms were down in April-September 1991.218
Reduced trading volume and declining customer confidence were
major factors in declining profitability.219 More specifically, dur-
ing April-September 1991, Yamaichi Securities Co. posted a
loss of 5.42 billion yen ($41 million). 220 For the same period, the
pre-tax earnings of Nomura Securities Co. was posted at 39.76
billion yen, a decline of some 64% from the previous year.221
Also, financial declines were apparent at Daiwa Securities Co.:
pre-tax profits declined some "70% to 20.62 billion yen. 222
Analogously, Nikko Securities Co.'s pre-tax profits fell 64% to
210 Id.
211 Id.
"" James Sterngold, Nomura Gets Big Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at D1.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
"" Id. at D5.
217 Id.
218 Quentin Hardy, Japan's Big Four Brokerage Firms Show Weakness, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 24, 1991, at A12 [hereinafter Hardy, Firms Show Weakness].
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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12.05 billion yen. Despite these disappointing figures, Norio
Yamaguichi of ABN AMRO Securities (Japan) explained that
they were not a significant problem for the Big Four. '23 After all,
according to financial analyst Alicia Ogawa of S.G. Warburg Se-
curities (Japan), these firms are well-capitalized and can over-
come hardship."2 4
However, medium-sized Japanese securities firms are
viewed to be in more serious trouble. They do not possess the
financial assets of the Big Four. 25 Thus, particularly ominous is
that of the six largest second-tier securities firms only one
earned a profit during April-September 1991.26 In particular,
Kankoku Securities Co.'s pre-tax profits fell 90%, from 23.50
billion yen the previous year, to 2.39 billion yen. ' Another firm,
New Japan Securities, had the largest loss of that tier of firms
during April-September 1991, 20.28 billion yen.'
Continued publicity about the scandals which hit the Japa-
nese financial community continued in 1992.29 More specifically,
in January 1992, Nui Onoue, an Osaka restauranteur, pleaded
guilty to defrauding some $1.45 billion from a number of Japa-
nese financial institutions. 23 0 Ms. Onoue supposedly forged de-
posit receipts from Japanese credit unions, including Toyo
Shinkin Bank.23 1 These forged deposit receipts were used as col-
lateral when she borrowed funds from banks, such as the Indus-
trial Bank of Japan - a bank in which Ms. Onoue was the big-
gest individual stockholder - to utilize in securities
speculation.232 Due to the introduction of this information in the
summer of 1991, the Industrial Bank of Japan's chairman,
Kaneo Nakamura, was forced to resign. 33
223 Id.
214 Quentin Hardy, Big Four Firms In Japan Slash Profit Outlooks, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 1991, at All.
225 Id.
220 Hardy, Firms Show Weakness, supra note 218.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Osaka Woman Admits Guilt In $1.45 Billion Loan Scam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
1992, at All.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
'" Id.
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Also, in February 1992, Japanese securities firms settled dis-
putes with specific key clients, who had been promised that a
repurchase of specific stocks would be made by the broker-
ages.23 4 Daiwa Securities Co., in a civil arbitration, agreed to pay
Tokyu Land Corp. $28 million for the securities firm's failure to
keep its promise-to-repurchase agreement involving stocks and
government bonds.235 Similarly, Cosmo Securities Co. agreed to
pay its former client, Skylark Co., $321 million for the broker-
age's inability to honor its repurchase agreement.2 36 These an-
nouncements by the securities firms will likely weaken their
credit ratings and public images.23 7
IV. FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN
Foreign banks in Japan registered their worst losses in the
business year ending March 31, 1990.238 Part of these losses were
attributed to the spectacular increase in interest rates, which
raised the cost of funds in the market. 239 Some foreign banks
attributed part of their losses to the impediments placed upon
foreign financial institutions. 40
In the business year ending March 1989, pre-tax profits on
eighty-three foreign banks in Japan were down fifty-seven per-
cent from the previous year. 241 Except for fiscal years 1985 and
1987, earnings of foreign banks in Japan declined.242 Neverthe-
less, foreign banks in Japan are in the market for the long-term.
Most foreign banks focus on their areas of expertise, such as
mergers and acquisitions, financial futures or options trading. 3
Japanese banks, which may not be as adept in these realms of
banking, are still able to take advantage of traditional banking
234 Quentin Hardy & Masayoshi Kanabayashi, Japanese Broker Daiwa To Pay Cus-
tomer $28 Million In Securities Buy-Back Pact, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1992, at A8.
236 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Higher Rates Blamed For Big Losses By Foreign Banks, KYODo NEWS SERVICE,
July 19, 1990.
239 Id.
240 Id. See also Nobuo Takahashi, Despite Red Inc, Foreign Banks Undismayed,
JAPAN EcoN. J., Aug. 26, 1989, at 2.
241 Takahashi, supra note 240.
242 Id.
243 Id.
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sectors.2" " In this arena, Japanese banks with strong connections
to Japanese corporations are able to influence and obtain their
client's business.24 5 Japanese banks can own up to five percent of
the equity of client companies; therefore it is difficult for foreign
banks to compete against Japanese banks. 46 As a result, foreign
banks have shied away from these banking sectors.24 However,
foreign banks assist Japanese clients with "international opera-
tions such as swap trading, serving as an intermediary in M&A
activities and underwriting securities issued on overseas mar-
kets." ' 8 The period of March-September 1989 was particularly
profitable for many foreign securities firms such as Kidder
Peabody and Salomon Brothers.249 A number of foreign securi-
ties firms, including Jardine Fleming and Morgan Stanley, have
been particularly successful in brokering equity warrant transac-
tions. 50 Moreover, American firms have done well by utilizing
sophisticated computer programs in various trading in stock in-
dex futures and option instruments.2 5' Also, Salomon Brothers
and other foreign firms have obtained more than thirty percent
of the ten-year government bond market. 52
Additional actions by the Ministry of Finance have enabled
foreign securities firms to gain a larger foothold in the TSE. 53
More specifically, in 1989, the Ministry of Finance limited "the
monthly trading of any single domestic broker. . . in a particu-
lar issue to less than [thirty percent] of the stock's total vol-
ume."' 54 Consequently, the impact of the Big Four in any single
stock was reduced, thereby enabling foreign firms and smaller
domestic firms to enter the market.2 55
Not all foreign securities firms desire to become full mem-
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
218 Id.
219 Foreign Securities Firms In Japan: Gilded Seats, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1990, at 78.
250 Id.
251 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
288 Id.
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bers of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 5 6 After all, some firms, such
as Chase Manhattan, argue that the TSE entry fee of $6.8 mil-
lion - approximately seven times the New York Stock Ex-
change price - is too high.2 57 Yet, the Ministry of Finance has
found fault in some of the foreign securities firms' activities,
particularly "booking their trades offshore and then charging the
settlement costs and other regional overheads to their Tokyo
offices. '2 58
The securities scandal involving Japanese firms was partly
responsible for gains by foreign securities firms in 1991.259 More
specifically, some Japanese institutional investors and foreign
entities, which formerly utilized Japanese securities firms, in-
creasingly used the services of foreign securities firms.260 In fact,
in June 1991, fifteen percent of the turnover on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange was based on foreign securities firms.261 Indeed, in
1991, U.S. securities firms in Japan had an excellent year. Salo-
mon Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley ranked
among the top five most profitable securities brokers for the fis-
cal year ending March 1992.212 Nine of the top ten foreign secur-
ities firms recorded profits for the period March-September
1991. In contrast, thirty-seven of forty-seven Japanese securities
firms reported losses for the period March-September 1991.263
VI. COMPLAINTS By FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
REGARDING THEIR TREATMENT IN JAPAN
The Institute of Foreign Bankers in Japan (Institute) set
out a list of proposals in response to key complaints that foreign
banking institutions in Japan have experienced. 2 4 First, in re-
sponse to foreign banks' complaints that funding capabilities
26 Id.
227 Id.
268 Id.
2' Hugh Levinson, Scandals Bring In Business For Foreign Securities Firms, JA-
PAN TIMES WEEKLY INT'L EDIT., Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1991, vol. 31, num. 34.
260 Id.
261 Id.
202 Ted Holden, Is Tokyo Getting Tough - Or Getting Jealous?, Bus. WK., May 25,
1992, at 110.
22 Tony Shale, The Gaijin Steam In, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1992, at 16-20.
2 NATALIE OHNISHI, JAPAN MARKET ACCESS POST-ACTION PROGRAM: THE LIBERALI-
ZATION OF THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKETS 60 (1987).
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were inadequate, the Institute called for the establishment "of a
free Yen interbank market in Tokyo similar to the Dollar in-
terbank market in New York (Fed Funds Market) or in London
(Euro-Dollar Market) . *.... "I Also, the Institute suggested the
deregulation of interest rates.2"' It asserted that recent attempts
to change interest rates on significant deposits and certificates of
deposits (CDs) were insufficient.2 67 Furthermore, the Institute
suggested that the Bank of Japan "should play the role of lender
of last resort and provider of liquidity also for foreign banks.""
Second, the Institute addressed the foreign banks' need to
further liberalize the Euro-Yen market.26 " This requires a "free
creation of borrowing and investment instruments by the market
participants . . . as well as free access by borrowers and inves-
tors to these instruments.2 7 0 Third, the Institute suggested that
Japan's securities business must be liberalized: to include proce-
dures to easily obtain permission to underwrite and trade gov-
ernment bonds; to include other instruments, such as floating
rate and interbank deposits when trading government bonds;
and to increase securitization of financial assets and liabilities. 71
Fourth, the Institute applauded preliminary plans to create To-
kyo Offshore Banking Units.2 72 Such financial instruments would
establish the necessary tax incentives that have made the inter-
national banking facilities in New York successful. 73 Fifth, the
Institute suggested that foreign banks be granted bank licenses
more freely.2 74 This would be achieved by utilizing a reciprocity
system of banking regulation.275 Also, there were apprehensions
about regulating foreign financial institutions in Japan.
Similarly, in a 1986 White Paper, the American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan (Chamber) highlighted foreign financial in-
stitutions' concerns in the Japanese financial market. In particu-
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
26 Id.
269 Id.
270 See generally Exchange Rate Issues, supra note 8, at § (V)(C).
271 OHNISHI, supra note 264, at 61.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
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lar, the Chamber suggested the following:
[i]nterest rate liberalization below the 100 million yen deposit
level; [c]reation of a meaningful Yen Treasury bill market;
[flurther access to Trust Banking and Pension Fund Manage-
ment business; [a]dditional membership in the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change by foreign firms; ja]bility of branches of foreign securities
firms to participate in Tokyo foreign exchange market; [f]ree data
transmission not allowed between banks and customers; [b]ill dis-
count market which does not adequately reflect the market sup-
ply and demand forces at all times; [1limits on overnight foreign
exchange exposure that are too restrictive in light of the dramatic
expansion of the size and activity of the Tokyo market; [t]ransfer
tax which still exists on certain securities; [flurther progress
needed to eliminate redundant reports; [riules for establishment
of securities firms with foreign bank ownership not clearly stated
or uniformly applied; [c]reation of an unrestricted yen interbank
market without collateral requirements; [flull liberalization of the
yen in the international markets to allow yen funds raised in in-
ternational markets to be freely used in Japan; [ulnfavorable tax
treatment of earnings in proposed Tokyo offshore banking unit
legislation; [ejnhancement of the clearance system for all securi-
ties; [e]stablishment of a foreign currency options market; and
[i]mproved participation by foreign branches of securities firms in
the domestic underwriting markets.2 7 6
Furthermore, foreign banks have raised complaints regard-
ing the extensive control which Japanese banks have over the
latter's clients. 7 Of the 1,612 companies listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, seventy-eight percent of market capitalization
(or 1,100 companies) can be designated as comprising a
keiretsu. 2 7 The bank-centered keiretsu, which makes up 61% of
171 AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN JAPAN, 1986 UNITED STATES- JAPAN WHITE
PAPER 42 (1987) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
'" Tony Shale, Reawakening The Sleeping Giant, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1990, at 14
[hereinafter Shale, Sleeping Giant].
278 Id. at 16. The keiretsu arrangement is:
the complex cross-shareholding structure that characterizes the Japanese financial
system.
Keiretsu have their historical roots in the pre-World War II zaibatsu indus-
trial groupings established among such old families as the Yasudas, Sumitomos,
and Mitsubishis. The zaibatsu were broken up during the American occupation
only to be replaced by the interlocking shareholdings between banks and their
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market capitalization (or 846 companies) includes the following
major Japanese banks: DKB (7.6% market capitalization); Fuyo
(7.1% market capitalization); Mitsubishi (11.0% market capital-
ization); Mitsui (9.8% market capitalization); Sanwa (5.8% mar-
ket capitalization); Sumitomo (10.7% market capitalization);
Tokai (1.0% market capitalization); and IBJ (7.8% market capi-
talization).2 7 The purpose of bank-centered keiretsu is "'to re-
build zaibatsu ties, to guarantee a company access to bank fi-
nancing and to protect a company from takeovers.' ",280 Robert
Zielinski, a senior analyst at Jardine Fleming Securities in To-
kyo, stated that the Japanese banks are refurbishing the
zaibatsu system, which stems from their aim to dissuade foreign
competition, while redesigning some backwards Japanese busi-
ness sectors. 8 '
While foreign financial institutions have expressed the
above concerns, Japanese banks and institutions have had suc-
cess abroad. For example, the Mitsubishi industrial group has
made some huge overseas acquisitions.182 In 1990, "Mitsubishi
Estate bought 57.6% of the Rockefeller Plaza for $960 million;
Mitsubishi Corporation bought control of Aristech Chemical for
$877 million. . . and Mitsubishi Trust & Banking was the main
lender in the $940 million purchase of the Pebble Beach Golf
course .. ,"283
In 1992, Japanese regulators took measures to make securi-
ties trading more expensive and difficult. 8" In particular, the
Ministry of Finance targeted the index arbitrage arena, in which
gains are made from price differences between the price of the
commercial borrowers that characterize the keiretsu.
Marshall Auerback, Japan Inc.'s Days Are Numbered, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1991, at A18.
See generally Keirestu and Other Large Corporate Groups in Japan, JAPAN ECON. INST.
REP., Jan. 12, 1990, No. 2A at 3; Robert Neff & William J. Holstein, Mighty Mitsubishi
Is On The Move: Its Hundreds Of Interdependent Companies Are Building An Empire
That Stretches From Rockefeller Center To Riyadh, Bus. WK., Sept. 24, 1990, at 98.
27 Shale, Sleeping Giant, supra note 277, at 16.
280 Id.
28I Id. at 17.
282 Id. at 18; Shale, Sleeping Giant, supra note 277, at 18.
283 Id. See William J. Holstein et al., Hands Across America: The Rise of Mitsub-
ishi, Bus. WK., Sept. 24, 1990, at 102.
,84 Ted Holden, Is Tokyo Getting Tough -Or Getting Jealous?, Bus. WK., May 25,
1992, at 110. [hereinafter Tokyo Getting Tough].
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index future and its underlying basket of stocks.285 According to
some reports, the Ministry of Finance would seek higher taxes
on profits arising from index arbitrage.2 "8 Also, perhaps the Nik-
kei Stock Index would be amended into a capital-weighted in-
dex, as the Standard & Poor's 500.287 In doing so, index arbi-
trage would be more costly since it would be more complex to
forge a small group of stocks that would follow the newly-de-
vised Nikkei Stock Index.28 8 Also, at the Osaka Stock Exchange,
where futures contracts on the Nikkei 225 index are traded,
margin requirements and commissions were raised.289 Such ad-
justments, American securities firms contend, are aimed at re-
ducing their profitability.290
Also, the Ministry of Finance has been slow to allow entry
by foreign firms in the mutual fund industry.291 Yet, in 1992, the
Ministry of Finance reviewed whether to reduce the minimum
capitalization of foreign mutual funds from $8 million to $2.5
million.292 Such a change would be welcome although not as
palatable as the $100,000 minimum capitalization requirements
on U.S. mutual funds.29 Also, U.S. fund managers, unlike fund
managers in Japan, may determine their own fees. 9' With such
restrictions, the Chief Counsel of Fidelity, Robert Pozen, sug-
gests, " 'There's still a very significant barrier to entry. It's a far
cry from an open market.' "295
VI. JAPANESE RESPONSE To COMPLAINTS REGARDING
RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN BANKING INSTITUTIONS
In response to the complaints by foreign financial institu-
tions in Japan regarding the treatment they received, the Japa-
nese Ministry of Finance promised increased access and liberali-
288 Id.
280 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
[Vol. 4:271
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/11
REGULATION IN JAPAN
zation in Japanese financial markets.296 In particular, the
Ministry of Finance focused on allowing foreign firms increased
membership on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), increased ac-
cess to government bond issues, reduced barriers to entry into
the trust and pensions business, increased access to Japanese se-
curities markets, and licenses for discretionary investment
management. 97
First, an Ad Hoc Committee on Membership Structure was
created at TSE to discuss increasing the number of foreign
members. From its inception in April 1949 until April 1982, the
TSE charter contained provisions denying foreigners member-
ship on the Exchange.298 Furthermore, because the TSE, like
other stock 'exchanges, is a non-governmental institution, the
pressure that the Japanese government could place on the Ex-
change was limited.299 Yet, there is an important distinction be-
tween entry into the TSE and the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE): "the NYSE is open to all qualified applicants willing to
pay the price of a membership, whereas new membership in the
TSE [is] tightly controlled and thus unavailable even to parties
willing to pay the price. ' ' 30 0 Prior to 1985 when six foreign firms
became TSE members, foreign securities firms operating in Ja-
pan did not have a seat at the TSE because all the spaces were
occupied."' As a result, these foreign securities firms lacked the
financial benefits intertwined with this designation.3 0 2 For these
foreign securities firms, the lack of a TSE seat meant that they
could not finalize contracts, underwrite primary offerings of Jap-
anese securities, or execute orders without paying broker
commissions. 303
, Ohnishi, supra note 264, at 56.
29 See infra notes 298-324 and accompanying text.
... GAO, International Finance: Market Access Concerns of U.S. Financial Insti-
tutions in Japan, March 1988, at 13 (United States Government Accounting Of-
fice) [hereinafter GAO].
299 Semkow, supra note 1, at 57.
300 GAO, supra note 298, at 15.
01 MOF Decides To Allow Foreign Members To TSE, JAPAN ECON. J., May 28,
1985, at 4; E.S. Browning and Chipello, Non-Japanese Firms Begin Push To Win Seats
On Tokyo Exchange, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1985, cited in Semkow, supra note 1, at 57.
.02 Barbara Thomas, Capital Formation in Japan and the United States: A Com-
parative Assessment, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 227, 234 (1983).
... Browning, Tokyo Exchange: To Join or Not To Join, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 27,
1985, at 32, cited in Semkow, supra note 1, at 57.
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To reiterate, it was not until November 1985 that foreign
firms became members in the TSE.3 4 Of the six foreign firms
allowed entry, four were American: Goldman Sachs, Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Citicorp's London-based affiliate,
Vickers da Costa Ltd.305 In December 1987, sixteen additional
foreign securities firms were admitted to the TSE, six of which
were American: Salomon Brothers, First Boston, Shearson Leh-
man Brothers, Kidder Peabody, Smith Barney, and Prudential
Bache .3 0 The TSE explained that it admitted foreign securities
firms based on "the applicant's financial standing, past business
performance, and experience in the Japanese secondary
market. ,307
Second, access to government bond issues by foreign finan-
cial institutions increased, thus easing foreign banks' ability to
purchase and sell Japanese government securities to the second-
ary market.3 08 Also, foreign financial institutions were provided a
larger role in underwriting secondary government securities.30 9
However, foreign participation in the Japanese government bond
sector continued to be marginal.31 0
To counter the dissatisfaction regarding limited access to
the ten-year Japanese government bonds, Japan has raised for-
eign securities firms' percentage of bonds distributed through
the underwriting syndicate." Yet, foreign financial institutions,
including U.S. firms, have been unable to persuade Japan to ap-
prove "a full auction process for government bonds in which is-
sue terms are freely determined through open market
competition. 31
2
Third, Japanese barriers on foreign banks were placed upon
the growing sector of managing trust and pension funds.313 For
example, a proposed joint venture between Nomura Securities
and Morgan Guaranty Trust that would permit them to work
30' GAO, supra note 298, at 13.
305 Id. n.2.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 13-14.
08 Ohnishi, supra note 264, at 56.
309 Id.
o GAO, supra note 298, at 15.
"' Id. at 16.
312 Id.
313 Frankel, supra note 8, at 46, citing, EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES, supra note 9.
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together in the trust sector was dismissed.314 The response to the
Nomura/Morgan proposal deterred similar initiatives by Bank of
America and Nikko Securities, Citicorp and Daiwa Securities,
and Yamaichi Securities and Chemical Bank.31 5 U.S. interest in
entering the trust banking area was due in part from the Japa-
nese pension fund market valued at $200 billion 3 16 The U.S. De-
partment of Treasury and the Japanese Ministry of Finance re-
sponded to this denial by issuing a May 1984 Report on the
Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate Issues.3 7
More specifically, the Yen/Dollar Report provided that the
Japanese would treat foreign commercial banks better than such
Japanese financial institutions.31 More specifically, foreign com-
mercial banks entering the trust area in the United States in-
spired this liberalization of laws regulating foreign financial in-
stitutions in Japan.31 9
The Ministry of Finance's rationale for dismissing the joint
venture stemmed from long-term opposition to permitting Japa-
nese commercial banks to enter the trust banking arena.2 0 In
Japan, separation between trust and commercial banks is as im-
portant as those between commercial and investment banks in
the United States. However, the United States perceived this re-
jection as a mere continuation of previous Japanese restrictive
practices. 321
Also, in order to increase their access to Japan's finance
markets, the Ministry of Finance agreed to permit additional
foreign securities companies and experienced foreign investment
management companies to enter Japan.2 2 Such actions helped
Japan internationalize its capital markets. Despite these
", Finance Minister OK To Nomura Morgan Plan; Says It's Long-Range Issue,
JAPAN ECON. J., Mar. 20, 1984, at 2; Semkow, supra note 1, at 46.
SB Citicorp Plans To Enter Trust Business in Japan, JAPAN ECON. J., Jan. 10, 1984,
at 1; Semkow, supra note 1, at 47.
311 Foreign Trust Banks Bolster Japan Preserved, JAPAN ECON. J., Aug. 29, 1987.
317 EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES, supra note 9, § (V)(B) Introduction.
... Semkow, supra note 1, at 59.
"' Only U.S. Banks Acting On Their Own Can Enter Japan's Trust Market, JAPAN
ECON. J., May 8, 1984 at 1.
3"' Katz' Industrial Policy Implications of Japan's Credit Structure Is More Im-
portant Than Yen Rate, JAPAN ECON. J., May 8, 1984, at 20; Semkow, supra note 1, at
47.
321 Semkow, supra note 1, at 47.
121 Ohnishi, supra note 264, at 56.
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changes, American banks in Japan complain that Japanese
banks have an unfair competitive advantage because U.S. bank-
ing regulators impose higher capital requirements on all U.S.
banks than Japanese banking regulators impose on Japanese
banks.2 3
VII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN
JAPAN
There are many recent developments in financial deregula-
tion affecting foreign banking institutions in Japan." 4 First, in
1984, the Ministry of Finance placed limits on the amount of
foreign exchange that both Japanese and foreign banks could
convert into Japanese currency with the object of lending these
funds in Japan. More specifically, effective June 1984, the Min-
istry of Finance ruled that previous swap limits on both foreign
and Japanese banks would be terminated.32 5 Second, in June
1985, the yen-denominated bankers acceptance market com-
menced.3 26 Third, as stated earlier, in November 1985, six seats
in the Tokyo Stock Exchange were allocated to foreign securities
firms.2 7 Fourth, in March 1986, the Tokyo Stock Exchange re-
laxed its listing requirements for large non-Japanese compa-
nies. 28 Fifth, in October 1986, "Bankers Trust [became] the first
foreign trust bank in Japan to co-manage a major Japanese cor-
porate pension fund." 329 Sixth, in December 1986, the Japan
Offshore Market began: "Japan's new international banking fa-
cility's initial size of the market was about $50 billion." 3 0 Sev-
enth, in April 1987, the share of Japanese five-, ten-, and
twenty-year government bond market for foreign securities firms
expanded.3 31
.23 GAO, supra note 298, at 18.
I" See WHITE PAPER, supra note 276, at 42; Frankel, supra note 8, at 44-47; Edward
L. Rubin, Deregulation, Reregulation and the Myth of the Market, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1249 (1988).
32 EXCHANGE RATE ISSUES, supra note 8, at § (V)(A) Interest Rates (4).
36 GAO, supra note 298, at 20; Ohnishi, supra note 264, at 15. See EXCHANGE RATE
ISSUES, supra note 9, at § (V)(A) Funding and Lending (2).
327 GAO, supra note 298, at 20.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
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Foreign pressure on the Ministry of Finance resulted in a
significant coup in 1986.32 More precisely, German banks in Ja-
pan were permitted to establish fully-functional securities opera-
tions, despite restrictions on other banks from entering the se-
curities business. 3  This MOF determination arose after
Germany argued that no legal impediments exist for Japanese
banks in Germany to enter the securities business.3 34 Thus, the
concept of reciprocity was demonstrated in practice.3 5 Soon too,
other foreign banks were permitted to carry out activities in the
securities business .3 3  Nevertheless, the banks which conduct
such work were required to establish "branch offices of securities
subsidiaries incorporated outside Japan in which their share-
holding does not exceed fifty percent." 3 7 Also, in permitting the
foreign banking institutions to enter the Japanese securities
arena, the Ministry of Finance concurrently created a loophole
in Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law for Japanese
banks.3 38
The impetus for the Japanese banks' interest in entering
the securities business stems from their observance that their
charts are increasingly utilizing the securities arena to raise
funds. 39 As banks slowly enter the securities realm in Japan, so
too are securities firms attempting to increase their role in bank-
ing.340 More specifically, securities firms seek to offer products
that are similar to basic bank products, such as bank deposits. 41
Accordingly, securities firms are interested in personal financial
assistance services such as Merrill Lynch's cash management
accounts. 42
Also, the British strategy to accelerate the progress of the
deregulation of Japanese financial markets was based on the rec-
13' Hinterhauser, supra note 34, at 67.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
330 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id.
'33 Id.
340 Id.
341 Id.
42 Id.
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iprocity model.143 More specifically, in November 1986, U.K.
Trade and Industry Secretary Paul Channon discussed with Ja-
pan's Ministry of Finance the topics of foreign securities firms
entry in Japan." Essentially, Channon expressed that if British
securities firms are denied further seats on the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change, the United Kingdom would revoke operating licenses of
Japanese securities firms in London.3 45
Next, in May 1987, "permission [was] granted to four for-
eign securities firms to join the underwriting syndicate for yen
bond issue by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone in the domestic
market. '346 Also, in June 1987, non-majority-owned securities
branches were established in Japan by U.S. banks. 47 In addi-
tion, in October of 1986, "Bankers Trust [became] the first for-
eign trust bank permitted to manage Japanese government pen-
sion funds."'348 Additionally, in October 1987, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange announced that twenty-two new members would be
added to the exchange.3 9 Furthermore, in November 1987, forty
securities firms, twenty Japanese and twenty foreign, filed mem-
bership applications with the Tokyo Stock Exchange.3 50 During
that same month, foreign dealers' share of a ten-year Japanese
government bond limiting auction from 15% under the old syn-
dicate system to about 5% increased. 51 Also, in November 1987,
foreign banks were able to compete with Japanese banks in the
commercial paper market.3 52 In addition, in December 1987, the
Tokyo Stock Exchange announced that it would grant member-
ship to an additional sixteen foreign institutions, including six
U.S. firms. 53
In 1988, foreign banks in Japan were told by Japan's Minis-
"' Lisa Martineau, A Long Wait For Foreign Banks, THE BANKER, January 1987, at
76.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 GAO, supra note 298, at 20.
347 Id.
348 Id.
311 Id. at 21.
360 Id.
361 Id.
311 Rosamund, McDougall, Sitting Tight In Tokyo?, THE BANKER, Feb. 1989 at 72-
73.
3 MOF Encouraging Foreign Bank Branch Establishment, COMLINE DAILY NEWS
TOKYO FIN. WIRE, April 19, 1990.
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try of Finance that "the establishment of branches by foreign
banks in Japan was 'in principle' free of the regulations that ap-
ply to branch-establishment by domestic banks."354 Although
domestic banks complained about this policy, foreign banks
were pleased. In fact, Citibank planned to open up to fifty
branches in the next decade."' Moreover, prior to November
1988, foreign banks in Japan were able to obtain funds almost
exclusively in the uncollateralized call money market. Conse-
quently, foreign banks were able to make loans to companies on
more favorable terms than their Japanese competitors, who were
dissuaded by the Bank of Japan from providing interbank loans
without collateral. Yet, in the Fall of 1988, the Bank of Japan
relaxed its supervision of that market, and Japanese banks
gained entry into the call money market. The consequence of
this change in policy is that competition in the call money mar-
ket is greater, because "the margin between the interest rates
banks charge their customers and the rates at which banks can
borrow" has decreased from .5% to presently .125%.11 In De-
cember 1989, The Tokyo Stock Exchange announced that it
would grant membership to three additional foreign
companies.3 57
In January 1990, the membership at the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change was expanded from 114 to 124. The fortunate foreign se-
curities firms-Credit Lyonnais, James Capel, and Barclays de
Zoete Wedd -joined the other 22 foreign securities firm mem-
bers of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 58 The importance of becom-
ing a full member of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is demonstrated
in that foreign firms who have obtained such a designation have
profited from the Tokyo Stock Exchange's fixed commissions.
59
More recently, in February 1991, Japan's Ministry of Fi-
nance allowed U.S. securities firms Salomon Brothers, Goldman
... Takahashi, supra note 240; JAPAN ECON. J., Aug. 26, 1989, at 2.
355 Id.
"3 Tokyo Stock Exchange Membership: Friction Expected To Continue, DAILY
NEWS FIN. WIRE, Dec. 19, 1989.
... Scott Miller, U.S. Brokers Win Japan Bank License, Face Tough Currency
Fight, REUTER Bus. REP., Feb. 7, 1991 [hereinafter Miller]; Pacific Watch, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1991, at D3, col. 3 [hereinafter Pacific Watch].
s58 Foreign Securities Firms in Japan: Gilded Seats, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1990, at 78.
359 Id.
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Sachs, and Morgan Stanley to compete as banks.36 0 Since trad-
ing in non-national currency is primarily limited to banks, the
Ministry of Finance granted these U.S. securities firms' Euro-
pean subsidiaries branch status in Japan, thereby enabling these
firms to apply for foreign exchange licenses. The foreign ex-
change licenses of the three securities companies were expected
to be granted in March 1991. Prior to this declaration, the three
securities companies were limited to conducting foreign ex-
change transactions only when related to their securities busi-
ness and to themselves as authorized dealers. Although these
three firms can enter a great number of transactions, a Goldman
Sachs official in Tokyo noted that his firm will likely focus on
foreign exchange and currency options. Nevertheless, this marks
another step towards dismantling Article 65 of Japan's Securi-
ties and Exchange Law.361
Indeed, as noted earlier, foreign financial firms have made
some penetration into the Japanese financial industry.32 In fact,
as of June 1991, about 20% of total membership at the TSE
-twenty-five securities firms-are foreign. 6 3 Foreign firms' ac-
tivities on the TSE comprise, according to Senior Managing Di-
rector of the TSE, Mitsuo Sato, "more than 10% of trading. "364
VIII. UNITED STATES LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
The United States attempted to counter the Japanese barri-
ers to foreign banks and securities firms with strong legislative
measures.36 5 Foremost among such legislation was the Primary
Dealer Provision (Provision) in the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 (Omnibus Trade Act). " Although this
360 Miller, supra note 358; Pacific Watch, supra note 358; at D3, col. 3.
361 Id.
311 " 'Foreign brokerage houses in Tokyo are doing very well, in light of their short
histories and high start-up costs.'" Harris, supra note 77, at 77. Moreover, Mitsuo Sato,
Senior Managing Director of the TSE, suggested with a grin, "Salomon Brothers is doing
well-maybe too well." Id.
33 Id. at 48. Also, the number of foreign firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
has more than doubled over the past five years, currently reaching the figure of 125. Id.
364 Id.
316 See infra notes 367-391 and accompanying text.
366 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988) [hereinafter OTCA of 1988]; Mark A. Pearson, Using
Legislation To Open Japan's Financial Markets: An Analysis of the Trade Bill's Pri-
mary Dealer Provision, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579 [hereinafter Pearson].
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provision does not require Japan or any other nation to liber-
alize its market access, legislative history provides that Japanese
discriminatory practices were considered.
3 67
The United States government has long asserted that Ja-
pan's financial and securities markets contain barriers that limit
access by U.S. firms'" The U.S. proffered that extensive liberal-
ization is needed, particularly in the sale of Japanese govern-
ment bonds.3'" The barriers in the Japanese bond market, as
viewed by the United States, are essentially two-pronged: lim-
ited access to the bond market and the syndication of bonds.
37 0
Limited foreign participation in the Japanese government
bond market, while on the increase, is relegated to an insignifi-
cant figure.371 The marginal participation of foreign firms in this
area follows 1987 Japanese legislation permitting an auction on
twenty-year government bond issues and a limited auction on
one-fifth of a distinct ten-year government bond issue. 72
Procedures for the sale of Japanese government bonds have
posed difficulties for the United States. While the United States
government sells bonds to the highest bidder in an open market
auction, the Japanese government uses a syndication system.
Under this method the Ministry of Finance determines in detail
the scope of the sale.373
The reasoning for the Japanese approach in the sale of
these bonds is several-fold. First, it allows the Japanese central
bank to maintain greater control over interest rates.3 74 If foreign
firms were allowed to compete, the domestic control would be
threatened. Second, it provides the Japanese firms with a sub-
stantial share of the bond market, giving these firms a strong
niche in the Japanese market. 7 5 Third, "if initial issuance of
... Pearson, supra note 366, at 579.
368 GAO, supra note 298, at 15-16.
,:9 Id. at 16.
- Id. at 15-16; see also Lyal Haughton, A Fair Slice of Pie Depends On The Point
of View, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1987, at 126 [hereinafter Haughton].
'I' GAO, supra note 298, at 15.
372 Id.
373 Houses Find Treasury Bond System Archaic, EUROMONEY, Supp., Apr. 1987, at
85; Pearson, supra note 367, at 584.
371 Pearson, supra note 366, at 585.
375 Michael R. Sesit & Herman, Japanese Firms Make Controversial Bid: The U.S.
Government Bond Market, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 7, 1987, at 32, col. 1 [hereinafter Sesit &
1992]
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bonds [were] done by auction, new maturities [would] cost more
because the Ministry of Finance might be forced to raise interest
rates in order to attract buyers. 3
76
While the use of the Primary Dealer Provision was sup-
ported by some in Congress, several segments of the United
States government and industry opposed it. 177 More specifically,
E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve of New
York, explained that this provision was the wrong way to liber-
alize Japan's financial system because it would likely anger Ja-
pan. 378 Moreover, Mr. Corrigan noted that the provision would
produce "adverse side effects - both in terms of general atti-
tude toward market liberalization and capital inflows to the
U.S.13 79 Second, U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker argued
that the United States had already made some advances in bi-
lateral discussions. In his view, further dialogue, rather than this
legislation, would assist U.S. financial institutions and maintain
foreign investment in the United States.3 18 Third, a U.S. bank-
ing industry representative, although acknowledging the benefits
of using tough legislation, argued that the United States should
continue utilizing the negotiation process.3 81
In contrast, adherents to the strict components of the provi-
sion argued that the legislation was the best method for getting
Japan's attention. It has been suggested that Japan's move-
ment to accelerate the opening of its markets was prompted by
the preliminary drafts of the Provision. 83 As the legislation
progressed in Congress, increased liberalization became
apparent. 3 4
Herman]; Pearson, supra note 367, at 586.
374 Haughton, supra note 371, at 128; Pearson, supra note 367, at 585.
. Sesit, supra note 376.
378 Pearson, supra note 366, at 587.
171 Id., citing United States Access to Japanese Financial Markets, 1987: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Budget, United States Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 52-54
(1987) (Appendix III to the testimony of E. Gerald Corrigan, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of
New York).
380 Pearson, supra note 366, at 588.
58' Id. at 587.
382 Michael R. Sesit, U.S. To Press Nakasone For More Access In Japan For Amer-
ican Financial Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1987, at 21, col. 3, cited in Pearson, supra
note 367, at 589.
383 Pearson, supra note 367, at 589.
384 Id. at 590-91.
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More recently, in May 1990, the Japan-United States work-
ing group on financial markets held its second session.38 5 The
United States representative, Treasury Undersecretary David
Mulford, stated that the United States was pleased with recent
Japanese liberalization in certain areas, including overseas bank
accounts.8 6 However, the United States government was troub-
led by restrictions on bank deposit rates and foreign firms' ac-
cess to the Japanese money market.""7
Now United States Congressional pressure on Japan, aimed
at speeding up financial deregulation, includes a proposed Fair
Trade in Financial Services Act. s8 This proposed legislation was
passed by the Senate and is being considered by the United
States House of Representatives. 9 It would permit the Federal
Reserve Board to "disapprove expansion of U.S. operations by
foreign financial institutions if the Treasury Secretary judges
that their countries fail to give U.S. institutions opportunities to
fairly compete in their domestic markets." 390 Such legislation
will pressure Japan to provide foreign financial institutions na-
tional treatment. In doing so, foreign financial institutions, such
as American banks, will be better able to compete with Japanese
banks in the lucrative Japanese market.
IX. CONCLUSION
Japan's regulatory structure regarding domestic and foreign
financial institutions has experienced steady and significant
changes. While this liberalization is necessary to integrate global
financial markets in general, and the Japanese system in partic-
ular, the elimination of other barriers would facilitate a step to-
wards further harmonization of financial regulations world-wide.
Ultimately, the concepts of national treatment and reciprocity
will merge when applied to the regulation of financial institu-
tions. Foreign banks will be treated in the same manner as do-
mestic banks (national treatment), and the activities that a for-
385 Masaharu Usuki, Tokyo Economist Says Japan Should Speed Deregulation,
AM. BANKER, August 24, 1990, at 4 [hereinafter Usuki].
388 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
388 Tokyo Getting Tough, supra note 284, at 110.
380 Usuki, supra note 386, at 4.
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eign financial institution will be allowed to carry out in Japan
will be determined by the treatment Japanese banks are given in
a foreign country, such as the United States (reciprocity). Since
large strides in harmonization should lead to unity in law, host
and home countries' laws will be equivalent. Yet, due to varying
degrees of development, many other economic matters and sig-
nificant political problems, such as a regulatory scheme for fi-
nancial institutions, are many years away.
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